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Early this year, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in San
Jos6, Costa Rica, was faced yet again with a seemingly basic question:
Does an individual have a legal right to know the truth about the circum-
stances surrounding the serious human rights violations a loved one has
suffered? One might expect to encounter such a privilege in our victim-
centered system of international human rights protection-especially
within the progressive jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court. Yet, it
is simply not to be found as a substantive, explicit right.
This Note seeks to explore the origins, scope, and key possibilities
of an evolving right to the truth. It will argue that truth is not only an
essential component of the universally recognized "right to an effective
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remedy," but that it also serves as the gateway to a broader reparative
framework necessary for victims of gross human rights abuse. The
analysis shall span the Inter-American, European, and United Nations
systems of human rights protection, and also will treat the burgeoning
idea of the truth commission, a very prominent means of extra-judicial
inquiry in contemporary transitional societies. At the conclusion, the
essay will evaluate the implications of a broader, victim-oriented concept
of remedy-in which truth plays a crucial role-for the United States as
well.
I. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS:
DISAPPEARANCES AND IMPUNITY
Dr. Oscar Arias, Nobel Peace Laureate, recollects the sad legacy of
the Cold War in Latin America: "[Tihe Superpowers provided the weap-
ons, we provided the corpses."' For decades, repressive military regimes
wiped out domestic opposition through a chilling pattern of forced dis-
appearances. 2  The Inter-American Convention on the Forced
Disappearance of Persons defines the elements of this practice:
the act of depriving a person or persons of his or their freedom,
in whatever way, perpetuated by agents of the [S]tate or by per-
sons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support,
or acquiescence of the [S]tate, followed by an absence of infor-
mation or a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom
or to give information on the whereabouts of that person,
thereby impeding his or her recourse to the applicable legal
remedies and procedural guarantees.3
Those detained are most typically tortured, and then killed.4
Government police and State-sponsored death squads would snatch
victims from classrooms or drag them from their beds. "Disappearing"
actual and perceived opponents in this way was quiet and efficient; mili-
tary juntas avoided creating martyrs and were spared undertaking the
risks and uncertainties of a public trial.' Naturally, these tactics produced
I. Personal Interview with Dr. Oscar Arias, San Josd, Costa Rica (Mar. 12, 1998).
2. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human
Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 451,453-54 (1990).
3. Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, Mar. 28, 1996, art.
2, at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-60.html
4. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2, at 454.
5. Id. at 455.
[Vol. 23:977
Truth as Right
widespread terror in the general populace and dramatically chilled po-
litical activity.
6
The sheer scale of disappearances has been overwhelming: in
Guatemala alone nearly 40,000 people were lost from the late 1960s to
the early 1990s.7 Over 9,000 vanished in Argentina during the military
dictatorship, which ruled from 1976 to 1983. Many thousands more
disappeared in Chile, Uruguay, El Salvador, and beyond this hemisphere,
in South Africa, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, the Philippines, East Timor, Sri
Lanka, Cambodia, and Uganda.8 Of course, this systematic abuse left
many more victims in its wake: the countless grieving and traumatized
family members of the disappeared. These individuals often did not
know the fate of their loved ones, nor were they handed over the
remains; as a result, they were unable even to properly mourn their tragic
losses.9
After the Cold War, waning military dictatorships in Latin America
hastily sought to arrange their own impunity. In at least eleven coun-
tries-Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname, and Uruguay-incoming civilian
leaders have chosen or have been obligated either to decree an amnesty
for serious human rights violations, or to accept one already proclaimed
by the military.'°
Yet de jure impunity, consisting of amnesty laws, presidential par-
dons and the like, is not the only means by which military officials have
escaped responsibility for their acts. Often overwhelming pressure to
"reconcile" is exerted upon new democratic institutions by the still-
powerful military, creating a de facto amnesty; all meaningful investiga-
tions into past violations are aborted or rendered ineffective as a
consequence." For very real examples of such intimidation, consider the
cases of Guatemala and Colombia, where the military has been impli-
cated in the constant harassment and assassinations of judges and
6. See, e.g., Viviana Krsticevic, How Inter-American Human Rights Litigation Brings
Free Speech to the Americas, 4 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 209, 209, 218 (1997).
7. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2, at 454.
8. Id.
9. See Alicia Oliveira & Marfa Josd Guembe, La Verdad, Derecho de la Sociedad, in LA
APLICACI6N DE LOS TRATADOS SOBRE DERECHOS HUMANOS POR LOS TRIBUNALES LOCALES
[APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES By LOCAL TRIBUNALS] 541, 549 (Martin Abregt
& Christian Courtis eds., 1997) (postulating a victim's "right to mourn").
10. Douglass Cassel, Lessons from the Americas: Guidelines for International Response
to Amnesties for Atrocities, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197, 200-01 (1996).
11. Juan M6ndez & Javier Mariezcurrena, Accountability for Past Human Rights Viola-
tions: Contributions of the Inter-American Organs of Protection, 26 Soc. JUST., Winter 1999,
at 84, 85-86.
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prosecutors.' 2 Finally, a third method to preclude accountability is par-
ticularly rife in Latin America today: military court jurisdiction is often
unjustifiably extended, allowing the army to absolve its own in contexts
that should clearly be controlled by civil authorities.'3
The clamor for a right to the truth was born out of the anguish and
indignation caused by these systematic patterns of gross human rights
violations and the subsequent impunity enjoyed by perpetrators.' 4 Juan
Mndez, an illustrious human rights attorney and scholar, has called the
right to the truth one of the most important issues in Latin America to-
day.'5 In fact, some commentators have identified this right as the newest
human rights construction, denoting a paradigmatic shift from conven-
tional criminal justice models toward victim-oriented remedies for both
survivors and the society at large. 6
That decades of State-sponsored terror in Latin America and else-
where have opened a new perspective on human rights theory comes as
no surprise. Yet, how is this wide-ranging concept defined in practice,
and has it served to hinder advocates as merely another "new" right to
undermine the moral force of rights long established in the international
community? Does a right to the truth have a solid legal foundation rec-
ognized by human rights tribunals to which, as a result, the victim and
family members may appeal and find redress?
12. PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND
ATROCITY 89 (2001).
13. Mdndez & Mariezcurrena, supra note 11, at 86 (stating that military jurisdiction must
be limited to specifically military offenses committed by members of the armed forces); see
also, UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
STUDY CONCERNING THE RIGHT TO RESTITUTION, COMPENSATION AND REHABILITATION FOR
VICTIMS OF GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS; STATE-
MENT SUBMITTED BY THEO VAN BOVEN T 130, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (1993)
[hereinafter STATEMENT OF THEO VAN BOVEN] (commenting on the abuses of military juris-
diction).
14. See UNITED NATIONS, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, QUESTION OF THE IMPUNITY OF PERPETRATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
(CIVIL AND POLITICAL): REVISED FINAL REPORT; STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY LOUIS JOINET
13, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/20/Rev.l (1997) [hereinafter STATEMENT OF LOUIS JOINET]
(explaining the roles of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo and the Latin American Federation
of Associations of Relatives of Disappeared Detainees (FEDEFAM), which later extended to
other continents).
15. M6ndez & Mariezcurrena, supra note 1I, at 94.
16. See Ruti Teitel, Beyond Vienna & Beijing: Human Rights Theory: Human Rights Ge-
nealogy, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 315 (1997).
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II. LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO THE TRUTH:
THE "EFFECTIVE" REMEDY AND CONCOMITANT
DUTIES TO INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE
A remedy is defined as "the enforcement of a right or the redress of
an injury... that a party asks of a court.' 7 All of the major international
human rights instruments, starting with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and proceeding to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), the American Convention on Human Rights
(American Convention), and the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention)
guarantee the right to an "effective" remedy or recourse after a rights
violation has occurred.'8
As explained above, forced disappearances, torture and extra-judicial
killings, known as "gross" human rights violations and included under
the rubric of "crimes against humanity" or "war crimes,"" were the bru-
tal impetus behind a broad-based call for the truth and thus comprise the
acts focused upon in this study.2° What, then, are the "effective remedies"
required for such baleful crimes? How may a State adequately provide
redress for one life taken in such a fashion, much less thousands? For
some time now, scholars have made the case that a State has the duty to
investigate and prosecute gross human rights violations as an essential
step in the remedial process, and some have even postulated that these
duties exist under international customary law.2'
Yet, speculation on the topic has become largely unnecessary in re-
cent years. The primary international human rights tribunals have traced
the explicit contours of an effective remedy in the wake of gross human
rights abuse, starting with the Inter-American Court's seminal Veldsquez
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 536 (Bryan Garner ed., pocket ed. 1996).
18. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
pt. 1, art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, art. 2.3, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; American Convention on Hu-
man Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 29, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter American Convention];
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, art. 13, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
19. STATEMENT OF THEO VAN BOVEN, supra note 13,1 18-13.
20. See Juan Mdndez, Responsibility for Past Human Rights Violations: An Emerging
"Right to the Truth", in TRUTH AND JUSTICE: IN SEARCH OF RECONCILIATION IN SURINAME
43, 44-45 (Alfredo Forti & Georgine de Miranda eds., 1999)
21. See Diane F Orentlicher, Addressing Gross Human Rights Abuses: Punishment and
Victim Compensation, in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 425, 426-48
(Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994); Jo Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and
Nothing but the Truth: Truth Commissions, Impunity and the Inter-American Human Rights
System, 12 B.U. INT'L L.J., Fall 1994, at 321, 333-37; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 2, at 489-
501.
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Rodriguez case," and have firmly established, at the very minimum, a
State's positive duty to investigate.
A. The European Court of Human Rights
The legal concept of a positive duty on States to investigate possible
human rights violations is a recent development in the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), emerging in decisions over
the last few years in cases against Turkey. 3 To begin, a positive duty to
investigate can be required vis- -vis article 13 of the European Conven-
tion, which guarantees the right to an effective remedy. In Aksoy v.
Turkey25 and Mentes v. Turkey,26 the ECHR interpreted article 13 as guar-
anteeing not only the availability of an effective domestic remedy to be
exercised on the initiative of the complainants, but also, in the event of
very serious allegations, the carrying out of a full investigation by public
authorities on their own motion. In Aksoy, "the fundamental importance
of the prohibition of torture" demanded independent action by the
State;27 in Mentes, it was required after the deliberate destruction of the
applicants' homes and belongings by government agents. However, this
of course implies that article 13 would not extend an obligation to con-
duct a sua sponte investigation for "less grave" human rights violations.
One may rightly ask where such a line could be drawn, or indeed
whether it should be drawn at all.
Second, in an interesting approach to safeguard the right to life (arti-
cle 2 of the European Convention) and bolster the prohibition against
torture (article 3), the ECHR may also find a procedural breach of either
of the two rights due to an inadequate investigation on the part of the
relevant authorities. 9 This interpretation was first developed in McCann
v. United Kingdom,0 where British security forces killed three IRA
22. Velhsquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 4, T 91 (July 29, 1988),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
23. Paul Mahoney, A Duty to Investigate Under the European Convention on Human
Rights, in 2 LINER AMERICORUM: HECTOR FIX-ZAMUDIO 1011, 1011-12 (Inter-Am. Court of
Human Rights ed., 1998).
24. European Convention, supra note 18, art. 13.
25. Aksoy v. Turkey, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 (1996), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp.
26. Mentes v. Turkey, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2689 (1997), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp.
27. Aksoy, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2287.
28. Mentes, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2716.
29. Note that a procedural breach of article 3 is quite rare, as the Court is more inclined
to deal with the lack of any effective investigation under article 13 in these instances. See, e.g.,
llhan v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 89-93 (2000), at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp.
30. McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995), at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
hudoc/default.asp.
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members suspected of a bombing mission in Gibraltar. The ECHR stated
in McCann:
The obligation to protect the right to life under [article 2], read
in conjunction with the State's general duty under [a]rticle 1 of
the Convention to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction
the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention", requires
by implication that there should be some form of effective offi-
cial investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of
the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State.3
The European Court was satisfied that the inquest held in Gibraltar,
which had lasted nineteen days and involved the interviewing of seventy-
nine witnesses, constituted "a thorough, impartial and careful
examination of the circumstances surrounding the killings."32
In Kaya v. Turkey,33 on the other hand, the ECHR ruled that the pro-
cedural right-to-life guarantee had been violated owing to an ineffective
investigation, despite what may have been considered to be extenuating
political circumstances. "[N]either the prevalence of violent armed
clashes nor the high incidence of fatalities can displace the obligation
under [a]rticle 2 to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is
conducted into deaths arising out of clashes involving the security
"314forces....
Thus, the ECHR has read the right-to-life guarantee along with arti-
cle 1 of the European Convention to arrive at a requirement for a
complete inquiry into any use of lethal force by State agents, regardless
of the context. In the last three years, decisions by the Court have both
affirmed this view and expanded it further. In Tanrikulu v. Turkey,35 since
there was insufficient evidence implicating the Turkish government in
the victim's death, the State argued that its duty to conduct an "effective
investigation" did not apply. Furthermore, the State asserted that "there
was no record of the applicant at any stage having made any explicit ac-
cusation" regarding the State's role in the killing.36 In response, the
ECHR stated:
[T]he [duty to investigate] is not confined to cases where it has
been established that the killing was caused by an agent of the
31. Id. 161.
32. Id. 163.
33. Kaya v. Turkey, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. 297 (1998), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp.
34. Id. at 326.
35. Tanrikulu v. Turkey, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 459, 487-88, available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp.
36. Id. at 487.
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State.... [T]he mere fact that the authorities were informed of
the murder of the applicant's husband gave rise ipso facto to an
obligation under [a]rticle 2 to carry out an effective investigation
into the circumstances surrounding the death.37
In this way, Tanrikulu clarifies the significant duty of the State to in-
vestigate introduced in McCann.38 In order for the State to fulfill its
"general duty" under article 1 to "secure to everyone within its jurisdic-
tion the rights and freedoms" of the Convention, it must act on its own
accord upon learning of any murder.
In the ECHR's idiosyncratic approach then, articles 2, 3, and 13 are
all capable of triggering a full investigation. However, as explained in
Kaya, the guarantees under article 13 are significantly broader than a
State's procedural obligation under articles 2 and 3:
[The right to an effective remedy] ... must have implications for
the nature of the remedies which must be guaranteed for the
benefit of the relatives of the victim. In particular, where those
relatives have an arguable claim that the victim has been unlaw-
fully killed by agents of the State, the notion of an effective
remedy for the purposes of [a]rticle 13 entails, in addition to the
payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and ef-
fective investigation capable of leading to the identification and
punishment of those responsible and including effective access
for the relatives to the investigatory procedure ......
In this way, Kaya crystallizes several essential points: first, an "ef-
fective remedy" explicitly serves the relatives of the victim unlawfully
killed, and redresses their injury with much more than monetary com-
pensation. To be specific, the remedy demands an investigation that must
be capable of identifying and punishing the offenders, thus defining what
an "effective" investigation entails for the purposes of article 13. Further,
the family members are given key access to the process. Finally, the ab-
sence of any of these elements in an "arguable claim" of a State-involved
killing precludes an effective remedy and violates article 13.
In sum, the European Court of Human Rights may not have estab-
lished a positive duty to investigate every possible rights violation.
Nevertheless, procedural article 2 obligations activate an effective inves-
tigation as soon as the government becomes aware of any murder. On the
other hand, the ECHR has not clarified whether it requires, as a part of
37. Id. at 487-88.
38. See also Ergi v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1751, 1778; Ya~a v. Turkey, 1998-VI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 2411, 2438, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/defauIt.asp.
39. Kaya, 65 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 330.
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an effective remedy, a duty to prosecute violations of a right to life, or
whether the investigation must only be "capable" of such a result. To be
sure, its stance on article 13 has been largely deferential to Contracting
States, affording them "some discretion as to the manner in which they
conform to their Convention obligations under this provision. 4° Thus,
although a duty to prosecute may emerge in the future, as for now its
status is still in question.4
B. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) took a very
expansive and unified approach to the duty to investigate in its ground-
breaking Veldsquez Rodriguez decision." The IACHR reasoned that
since, according to article 1.1 of the American Convention, a "State
Party is obligated to guarantee the full and free exercise of the rights
recognized by the Convention to every person subject to its jurisdic-
tion,,:43
The State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a
violation of the rights protected by the Convention. If the State
apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes unpunished
and the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored as
soon as possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty...
The same is true when it allows private persons or groups to act
freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recog-
nized by the Convention."
40. Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 2000-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 151, 185, available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp. Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) signaled in this case a reluctance to extend the wider scope of article 13 remedies in
Kaya to violations not involving loss of life.
41. Although conservative on this front, it is interesting to note that in Osman v. United
Kingdom, the ECHR established a standard providing for a State's affirmative protection of its
citizens, rooted in articles 1 and 2. Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 3124,
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp. This expansive guarantee ceased to be
mere rhetoric in Mahmut Kaya when the Court held that two violations of article 2 had oc-
cuffed: first, because the government failed to protect the life of the victim; second, on
account of the failure of the authorities to conduct an effective investigation into the circum-
stances of his death. Consider that these violations were found despite the fact that it was not
established beyond reasonable doubt that any State agent was involved in the victim's killing.
Mahmut Kaya, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. at 181, 183. Regarding the duty to protect, the ECHR
maintained that there were nonetheless "strong inferences that [could] be drawn on the facts of
the case that the perpetrators of the murder were known to the authorities." Id. at 177.
42. Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 4, 91 (July 29, 1988),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
43. Id.T 166.
44. Id. T 176 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the Inter-American Court chose quite a different path than the
European Court of Human Rights would in McCann a few years later in
the ECHR's interpretation of a similar provision to "secure to everyone
... the rights and freedoms ... of this Convention. 45 As a result, the
State is unequivocally required to investigate every context involving a
rights violation of the American Convention, even in situations where the
perpetrator of the act is a private person.46 "An effective search for the
truth" must be assumed by the State itself and does not depend upon the
initiative of the victim or relatives.47 Further, the Inter-American Court
also demands an effective investigation despite difficult country condi-
tions.48 And if any doubt were left regarding an express duty to prosecute
and punish, subsequent cases have elaborated that article 1.1 also stipu-
lates a clear State obligation to punish all violations of rights recognized
by the Convention as a means of guaranteeing those rights.49
Inter-American Court precedents also provide extensive opportuni-
ties for victims and family members to be actively engaged in both the
clarification of facts and the subsequent criminal process as an important
way to receive their due reparation. 0 Thus, the "effective remedy" in the
Inter-American system even surpasses government investigation and
prosecution after gross human rights abuse. It is interesting to note that
these remedial rights stem as much from articles 1.1 and 25 (the judicial
remedy provision of the American Convention), as they do from article
8, which safeguards the right to a fair trial as well as other fundamental
rights of criminal procedure. This anomaly owes to the fact that in some
Latin American nations, the victim enjoys a significant role in the crimi-
nal proceeding.' Thus, article 8 also protects, where applicable, a
victim's right to a fair and effective criminal prosecution." Such a provi-
sion may prove particularly useful, for example, when military
jurisdiction is wrongly asserted over a soldier accused of human rights
violations. Article 8 demands, inter alia, an "independent and impartial
45. European Convention, supra note 18, art. 1.
46. Veldsquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 4, 172. The general Veldsquez
Rodriguez, principles as to a duty to investigate have been confirmed in subsequent cases. See,
e.g., Godfnez Cruz Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 5, 175, 188, 191, 198 (Jan. 20,
1989); Fair6n Garbi and Solfs Corrales Case, Inter-Am. Ct. Hum. Rts., ser. C, no. 6, $ 158
(Mar. 15, 1989); Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Inter-Am. Ct. Hum. Rts., ser. C, no. 22,
58 (Dec. 8, 1995).
47. Veldsquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 4,1 177.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Villagrtn Morales Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 63, 1225 (Nov. 19,
1999), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
50. Id. 91 227.
51. See Pasqualucci, supra note 21, at 356.
52. Villagrdn Morales, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 63, 229.
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tribunal." An interested military judge would likely fail to provide a fair
trial, and would thus violate article 8."
The Inter-American Court has ruled repeatedly on the phenomenon
of forced disappearance and its devastating effects upon a victim's rela-
tives."4 Since the beginning, the IACHR has been clear that forced
disappearances constitute a "flagrant violation of the right to life" and a
woeful disregard of human dignity.5 Moreover, "the duty to investigate
facts of this type continues as long as there is uncertainty about the fate
of the person who has disappeared."56 Even when those responsible for
violations are protected by amnesty laws,57 "the [S]tate is obligated to
use the means at its disposal to inform the relatives of the fate of the vic-
tims and, if they have been killed, the location of their remains."58
Subsequently, the IACHR, taking into account article 1.2 of the
United Nations Declaration on the Protection of All Persons Against En-
forced Disappearance, recognized that "[a]ny act of forced
disappearance places the victim outside the protection of the law and
causes grave suffering to him and to his family."59 As a result, the Court
took special pains to emphasize that tormented family members in these
circumstances deserve to have those responsible duly prosecuted and
punished and also require adequate compensation for the damages and
injuries they sustained. Moreover, the IACHR has pointed out that be-
cause article 25 guarantees fundamental mechanisms such as habeas
corpus, the provision supplies an important means both to determine the
whereabouts of detained persons and to prevent forced disappearance in
any circumstance. 6°
53. For similar issues of military jurisdiction, see generally, Cantoral Benavides Case, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 69, 110-15 (Aug. 18, 2000), available at http://
www.corteidh.or.cr.
54. The IACHR's jurisprudence in this area has exerted considerable influence interna-
tionally, including upon the European Court of Human Rights. See, e.g., Timurtas v. Turkey,
App. No. 23531/94, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 147 (2000), at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/
default.asp.
55. Veldsquez Rodrfguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 4, 157 (July 29, 1988),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
56. Id. 181.
57. Last year, the Court ruled that national amnesty laws that "are intended to prevent the
investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious violations of human rights such
as torture, summary, extra-legal, and arbitrary executions, and forced disappearance" were
forbidden. Barrios Altos Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 75, 41 (Mar. 14, 2001), avail-
able at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
58. id.
59. Blake Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 36, 97 (Jan. 24, 1998), available at,
http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
60. Id. 103. The Inter-American system also provides for the affirmative protection of
individuals, although in different terms than in European system. In Veldsquez Rodriguez, the
Court described "the duty ... to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all
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C. United Nations Human Rights Committee
The United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) has also
emphasized that the state has a duty to investigate "thoroughly" cases of
disappearance, asserting that, under article 6 of the ICCPR (the right to
life)61:
[S]tates parties should also take specific and effective measures
to prevent the disappearance of individuals and establish effec-
tive facilities and procedures to investigate thoroughly, by an
appropriate and impartial body, cases of missing and disap-
peared persons in circumstances which may involve a violation
of the right to life.62
Thus, as found in the European system, a "procedural" duty to inves-
tigate under article 6 can be required independently of the "effective
remedy" provision.
Moreover, under article 2.3 of the ICCPR, the UNHRC goes beyond
the European Court in the remedy that it provides victims and relatives,
in the event of any alleged violation of the right to life. Besides ordering
a "proper investigation" into the fate of the victim and appropriate com-
pensation, the UN body urges the State "to bring to justice" those
responsible for the acts "notwithstanding any domestic amnesty legisla-
tion to the contrary. 63 Additionally, complaints of torture and inhumane
treatment, like claimed violations of the right to life, "must be investi-
gated promptly and impartially by competent authorities so as to make
the remedy effective."6
Still, a tension exists regarding precisely when a remedy must be
"judicial" in order to be considered "effective" under the ICCPR. This is
because the treaty itself does not specify when an administrative, legisla-
tive, or "any other competent authority provided for by the legal system
structures through which public power is exercised, so they are capable of juridically ensuring
the free and full enjoyment of human rights" Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 4, 1 166.
Considering the underlying philosophy common to both systems, the Deputy Registrar of
the European Court has remarked that it would not be surprising if the European Court were
"to move progressively towards a more comprehensive doctrine of a duty to investigate along
the lines already traced by the Inter-American Court." Mahoney, supra note 23, at 1024.
61. ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 6.
62. Laureano v. Peru, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 56th Sess., 8.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993 (1996).
63. Id. T 10. Regarding amnesties, in Rodriguez, the Committee explains that the adop-
tion of blanket amnesty legislation "excludes in a number of cases the possibility of
investigation into past human rights abuses and thereby prevents the State Party from dis-
charging its responsibility to provide effective remedies to the victims of those abuses."
Rodrfguez v. Uruguay, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 51st Sess., 12.3, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/5 IID/322/1988 (1994).
64. Rodrfguez v. Uruguay, supra note 63, 12.3.
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of the State" may be employed in the place of a judge in determining a
remedy and sanctioning the guilty.65 In Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia,
a victim was abducted, tortured, and killed by armed men dressed as ci-
vilians.' 6 In 1995, Colombia's National Delegate for Human Rights,
upon completion of its official disciplinary proceedings, held two mili-
tary officials responsible for the disappearance and requested their
dismissal. Following these findings, a national administrative tribunal
awarded the victim's family damages, and the President of Colombia
dismissed one of the officials from the armed forces. The UNHRC re-
fused to accept the various measures as constituting a sufficient remedy,
stating:
purely disciplinary and administrative remedies cannot be
deemed to constitute adequate and effective remedies within the
meaning of article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, in the event
of particularly serious violations of human rights, notably in the
event of an alleged violation of the right to life.
67
In this way, the UNHRC emphasizes that, at least in instances of dis-
appearance and other violations of the right to life, mere administrative
steps and the transfer of funds are not sufficient to remedy the serious-
ness of the offense and the trauma suffered by the victim's family. The
UNHRC, like its Inter-American counterpart, is plain in requiring a
complete judicial remedy in these contexts, insisting that the State
"prosecute criminally, try and punish those held responsible for such
violations., 68 Furthermore, according to the UNHRC, "this duty applies a
fortiori in cases in which the perpetrators of such violations have been
identified."69
The foregoing discussion has shown that the State's positive duty to
investigate (and perhaps duty to prosecute as well) is invariably required
in the major international human rights systems as part of an effective
remedy in the event of a gross human rights violation. The
65. See ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 2.3(b).
66. Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, Communication No. 503/1993, U.N. GAOR, Hum.
Rts. Comm., 55th Sess. [ 2.1-2.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/1993 (1995).
67. Id. T 8.2. This holding has been reaffirmed in subsequent communications. See, e.g.,
Coronel v. Colombia, Communication No. 778/1997, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 70th
Sess. 2.25, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/778/1997 (2000).
68. Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, supra note 66, 8.6.
69. Id. This also has been reaffirmed in subsequent communications. See, e.g., Arhuacos
v. Colombia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 60th Sess., 612th mtg. 8.8, U.N. Doc
CCPR/C/60/D/612/1995 (1997).
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Inter-American Court has called such a mandatory investigation "an
effective search for the truth., 70 As this Note shall discuss, the
elucidation of the State-repressed truth-from the perspective of the
victim and/or family members-appears to surpass the criminal process
in importance and comprises the most fundamental result of an official
response to rights abuse.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE RIGHT TO THE TRUTH IN
INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW
If the truth itself is so crucial, then, why does the victim not
explicitly demand from the outset her right to the truth as part of the
effective remedy due her? Petitioners have done this very thing in the
Inter-American system. Both the Inter-American Court, as mentioned in
the introduction of this Note, and the Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights have dealt expressly with this right, alternatively known
as the "right to know the truth." The following Section considers its brief
history.
In the 1997 case Castillo Pdez, the IACHR was first faced with rul-
ing on a substantive right to the truth, and conceded that it may
"correspond to a concept that is being developed in doctrine and case
law."7' Nevertheless, the right was disposed of by merely reiterating the
State's continuing obligation to investigate the events that led to the gov-
ernment-sponsored disappearance at issue.72
Bdmaca Veldsquez,73 decided in November of 2000, presented the is-
sue again, but this time the petitioners and the Inter-American
Commission7" brought along abundant supporting research on the right
as well as the political weight of a case long in the international spot-
light. Efrafn Bdimaca Veldsquez was a Guatemalan guerrilla commander
disappeared by government army forces.75 Jennifer Harbury, his spouse
and a U.S. lawyer and writer, led an active, prolonged campaign to dis-
cover his fate.76 When met with forceful opposition from all levels of the
70. Velisquez Rodriguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 4, 177 (July 29, 1988),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
71. Castillo Pdiez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 34, T 86 (Nov. 3, 1997), available
at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
72. Id.
73. Bdmaca VelIsquez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 70 (Feb. 22, 2000), available
at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
74. The Inter-American Commission, in addition to acting as a quasi-judiciary body, also
brings cases before the Inter-American Court on behalf of victims.
75. Bdmaca Veldsquez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., set. C, no. 70, 1 18.
76. Id.
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Guatemalan State and even impeded in her efforts by U.S. government
officials, she resorted to hunger strikes to demand attention and justice.77
In its decision, the IACHR recognized that continued obstruction by
Guatemalan authorities has prevented Harbury from even locating the
remains of her husband.78 Due to these actions and others, the Court as-
serted that it was unquestionable that Harbury and other family members
have been precluded from learning the truth behind the victim's fate.79
Nevertheless, their explicit right to the truth was considered subsumed
by their rights to due process and judicial remedies-protected by arti-
cles 8 and 25 of the American Convention,' respectively-which, as
discussed above, provide for effective investigation and prosecution of
the violations.80 In March of 2001, the Court essentially duplicated the
Bdmaca Veldsquez analysis in its Barrios Altos ruling.'
Clearly, if the right to the truth composed only an element of these
judicial guarantees, it would not need to exist as a separate source of
human rights protection. Yet, the IACHR's view does not consider why,
for example, UN Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet has specifically
identified the right to the truth as "inalienable" and "imprescriptible.
8 2
Nor does the opinion address the emphasis placed by another UN
Rapporteur, Theo Van Boven, on "the complete and public revelation of
the truth" as the first requirement of justice. 3 A brief study of reports
issued by the Inter-American Commission will signal essential aspects of
this right that the Court has not yet been willing to endorse officially.
In Ellacuria, a case dealing with the shocking assassination of Jesuit
priests by Salvadoran military agents in 1989, the Commission did in
fact find a violation of a right to know the truth. 4 A crucial framework is
advanced here that the Court has been reluctant to recognize. The right
to the truth actually consists in two fundamental components: both an
77. Id.
78. Id. 200.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Barrios Altos Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 75, 47-49 (Mar. 14, 2001),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
82. See STATEMENT OF Louis JOINET, supra note 14, at Annex II.
83. See STATEMENT OF THEO VAN BOVEN, supra note 13, 134.
84. Ellacurfa v. El Salvador, Case 10.488, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/
V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. (1999), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/merits/
elsalvadorlO.488.htm. Note that Lucio Parada Cea v. El Salvador, offers nearly an identical
analysis and presentation of the "right to know the truth." Case 10.480, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/ser.LN/II.102, doc. 6 rev. (1999), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/
98eng/merits/elsalvador%2010480.htm; see also Romero y Galddmez v. El Salvador, Case
11.481, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. (2000), available at http://
www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99span/de%20fondo/elsalvadorl 1481 .htm.
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individual right, applying to the victim and family members, and a gen-
eral societal right.
Concerning the "private" aspect, the Commission has essentially
taken the State's duty to investigate and its obligation under article 1.1 of
the American Convention "to use the means at its disposal to inform the
relatives of the fate of the victims and ... [of] the location of their re-
mains,"" and redefined them to constitute an expansive right of the
family members. In the report, it is specified as "the right to know the
truth with respect to the facts that gave rise to the serious human rights
violations that occurred in El Salvador, and the right to know the identity
of those who took part in them." 6 The farthest that the IACHR has been
willing to go in this regard is to confer a right on a victim's relatives to
have the disappearance and death effectively investigated and prose-
cuted, as well as to receive compensation for the damages and injuries
they sustained.87 Such a right clearly does not furnish the extensive in-
formation required by the Commission's right to know the truth, which
goes far beyond the scope of the violation suffered in any particular case.
The Commission briefly mentions in Ellacuria that the private right
to know the truth is also linked to article 25 of the American Conven-
88tion. Because El Salvador's amnesty law89 impeded "access to
information relating to the facts and circumstances surrounding the vio-
lations," the truth was not available for the relatives, and as a result,
neither were remedies available under domestic jurisdiction.9°
Also in support of an individual's right to the truth, the Inter-
American Commission cited a key precedent from the UN Human
Rights Committee, Quinteros v. Uruguay.9' Quinteros in fact deserves
more attention than the pithy consideration it received in Ellacurta.92 In
that case, the UNHRC found that a mother had endured substantial an-
guish and stress owing to the disappearance of her daughter and the
continuing uncertainty of her fate and whereabouts. 9 In this context of
acute suffering, which itself was held to be a form of cruel and inhuman
85. Velisquez Rodrfguez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 4, 181 (July 29, 1988),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
86. Ellacuria, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II. 106, doc. 3 rev., 221.
87. Blake Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 36, T 97 (Jan. 24, 1998), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
88. Ellacuria, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev., 225.
89. Note that the Commission in 1992 declared that amnesty legislation in Uruguay, El
Salvador, and Argentina all violated the American Convention. See Pasqualucci, supra note
21, at 348-49.
90. Ellacuria, Inter-Am. C.H.R., T 225.
91. Quinteros v. Uruguay, Communication No. 107/1981, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 19th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981 (1981).
92. Ellacurfa, Inter-Am. C.H.R., T 227.
93. Id. 114.
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treatment, the UNHRC ruled that the mother had a basic "right to know"
what had happened to her daughter.94 Toward this end, the UNHCR con-
cluded that the Government needed to take immediate and effective
measures to establish the facts, secure the daughter's release (if applica-
ble), bring to justice those found responsible, and ensure that similar
violations did not occur in the future.95
It is significant for the purposes of this Note to underscore that at
some points in Ellacuria, the Inter-American Commission presents the
right to the truth as a direct remedy in itself. For example, as regarded in
Quinteros, truth served to assuage the suffering of the mother by at least
ending the uncertainty regarding her daughter's fate. Yet, in the Com-
mission's passing reference to article 25, the right is described as a
privilege of access, a procedural right to initiate domestic legal mecha-
nisms such as an investigation and prosecution; that is, a first step that
enables one to seek remedies at all. Indeed, this dual nature of truth
sketched by the Commission will remain a constant theme in this study.
Proceeding to the second prong of the Commission's analysis in
Ellacuria, it asserts the public's right to the truth in broad terms as well:
[E]very society has the inalienable right to know the truth about
what has occurred, as well as the reasons and circumstances in
which those crimes came to be committed, so as to avoid a repe-
tition of such events in the future.96
Although the report's provided reasoning is somewhat unclear, the
primary justification for this societal right may be attributed to article
1.1, which it is recalled provides that "a State Party is obligated to guar-
antee the full and free exercise of the rights recognized by the
Convention to every person subject to its jurisdiction. 97 Thus, in order to
ensure such rights for the future, goes the argument, the society must
learn from the abuses of its past, and for this to be possible it falls upon
the State to keep its citizenry "duly informed."98
Directly related to this idea is the Commission's use of article 13 of
the American Convention, which protects freedom of thought and
expression, to strengthen the case for the right to the truth. Specifically,
the article includes "freedom to seek, receive, and impart information
and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers ... 99 The Commission
94. Id.
95. Id. 116.
96. Ellacurfa, Inter-Am. C.H.R., 226.
97. Id.
98. Lucio Parada Cea v. El Salvador, Case 10.480, Inter-Am. C.H.R.,
OEA/ser.L/VII. 102, doc. 6 rev. 153 (1999), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/
98eng/merits/elsalvador%2010480.htm.
99. American Convention, supra note 18, art. 13.1.
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declares that such access to information "is essential for the workings of
democratic systems" but forgoes any justification or explanation for its
conclusion."
Commentators, however, have been more forthcoming about how ar-
ticle 13 (perhaps the most generous provision of its kind among
international instruments) and the right to the truth interact. Viviana
Krsticevic, Executive Director of the Center for Justice and International
Law, states that although the right to the truth is grounded in the right to
a remedy, it is also an important corollary of the freedom of informa-
tion."°0 For, not only should individuals be free to receive and impart
"information and ideas of all kinds," they must also be assured of obtain-
ing the truth from their government. '02 As the Inter-American Court itself
has held, "a society that is not well informed is not completely free."'103 In
this way, the right to the truth both facilitates and provides moral force to
the essential functions made possible by the freedom of information in a
democracy, such as the close monitoring of abuses and the encourage-
ment of public debate and criticism.'4
This analysis of the Inter-American Commission's jurisprudence on
the right to the truth concludes with Lapac6 v. Argentina, an important
settlement reached during February 2000, where the State of Argentina
promised to "accept and guarantee the right to the truth."'' 5 In this case,
the petitioner's daughter was abducted by armed men and taken to a
detention center from which she never escaped."' 6 In response, Carmen
Lapac6 and many others turned to a collective criminal proceeding
against several military officials, but a subsequent amnesty law and
presidential pardon exonerated all defendants in the petitioner's case.'07
After the Argentine Supreme Court refused to permit continuing
investigations into the matter, though these processes sought only to
procure an account of the facts rather than to establish criminal liability,
the Inter-American Commission admitted Lapac6's petition. 08 The
settlement committed the Argentine Government to "the exhaustion of
all means to obtain information on the whereabouts of disappeared
100. Ellacurfa, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 224.
101. Krsticevic, supra note 6, at 224.
102. Id.
103. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of
Journalism, Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. A, no. 5, 50 (1985).
104. Krsticevic, supra note 6, at 218-19.
105. Lapac6 v. Argentina, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev. 17 (Feb.,
29, 2000), at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/friendly/argentinaI 2.059.htm.
106. Id. 9.
107. Id. I11.
108. Id. [ 15.
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persons"; although "it is an obligation of means, not of results," the
commitment is not subject to prescription.
Practically speaking, this settlement does not require more than what
was already demanded by Inter-American Court case law. Namely, it
provides for the State obligation "to use the means at its disposal to
inform the relatives of the fate of the victims and, if they have been
killed, the location of their remains," a duty that continues as long as
there is uncertainty about the fate of the person who has disappeared." °
Furthermore, the agreement does not address the societal dimension of
the right to the truth, which entails a public revelation of "the reasons
and circumstances in which those crimes came to be committed.""'I
Nevertheless, in Argentina's own historical context, this settlement
comprises a significant breakthrough. First, it provides a direct manner
for family members to access precious information denied to many of
them for over two decades, since the country's National Commission on
Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP) did not seek to determine the
individual circumstances behind every disappearance."' Furthermore, the
settlement represents the first explicit government recognition of the
right to the truth, which in itself constitutes a momentous occasion in the
development of the concept.
Thus, a discussion of the pioneering jurisprudence of the Inter-
American system has suggested that an individual and societal right to
the truth provides several key remedial possibilities to the victim of gross
human rights violations. First, in the case of disappearance, only by
determining the truth regarding a victim's fate is the ongoing violation
finally stopped and the State's duty to investigate satisfied."3 Indeed, as
article 3 of the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of
Persons declares, "[tihis offense shall be deemed continuous or
109. Id. 17.
110. Veldsquez Rodrfquez Case, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 4, 181 (July 29, 1988),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
Ill. Ellacurfa v. El Salvador, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev., 1226
(1999), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/merits/elsalvador I0.488.htm.
112. Lapac6, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 10, at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99eng/
friendly/argentina I2.059.htm. Of course, since the amnesty legislation remains in place, the
family members would not be able to pursue criminal proceedings against the perpetrators of
the crimes. However, some recent prosecutions have been possible based on specific excep-
tions to these laws, which allow for criminally charging those who kidnapped the children of
the disappeared, some of whom were born in captivity. See Wilson, The Inter-American Hu-
man Rights System: Activities During 1999 Through October 2000, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
315, 335 (2001).
113. Veldsquez Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 4, 181.
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permanent as long as the fate or whereabouts of the victim has not been
determined.""' In rare instances, of course, this requirement to elucidate
the facts immediately may actually even save the detainee's life if the
abduction is reported soon enough. Secondly, in the brief reference to
Quinteros, the truth was cast in a different light: as a way to alleviate the
actual suffering caused by the disappearance of a loved one. Third, truth
has been recognized as a means to procure other remedies. For instance,
the truth bolsters the freedom of information in some circumstances. It is
also necessary to assess appropriate monetary damages and to facilitate
effective prosecutions and other judicial guarantees. Finally, a societal
right to know the truth has been regarded as fundamental for a citizenry
to prevent the recurrence of widespread atrocities.
IV. THE TRUTH AS A GATEWAY TO AN "INTEGRAL"
REMEDIAL PROCESS FOR THE VICTIM
A. Truth Commissions
Based upon this Note's review of international jurisprudence, it is
certainly reasonable to conclude that, whether as an explicit right or oth-
erwise, the truth comprises an essential component of an "effective
remedy" in the wake of gross human rights violations. Parallel to this
quiet evolution of the right to truth as remedy in international tribunals,
the world has seen an almost explosive movement toward the establish-
ment of truth commissions: State-authorized, temporary bodies that
investigate a pattern of human rights violations over a specified period of
time."' At least twenty-one official truth commissions have materialized
since 1974, a phenomenon which apparently affirms truth's inherent
value to victims of systematic abuse.'16 The following brief analysis of
truth commissions will indicate, however, that truth itself, although es-
sential for victims and society at large, comprises merely the first step of
the complete remedial process required after widespread human rights
violations.
Some commentators believe that a State's duty to investigate and
provide effective remedies, especially in the absence of a functioning
judiciary system, mandates the creation of a truth commission to exam-
114. Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra note 3, art.
3.
115. Michael Scharf has even proposed an international truth commission. Steven Rat-
ner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in International Low, 87 GEO. L.J. 707,746
(1999).
116. HAYNER, supra note 12, at 14.
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ine a harshly repressed past. "7 Rob Weiner of the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights, believes that three steps should be considered mini-
mal requisites after a period of long-standing abuse: an inquiry into the
facts by proper authorities, an opportunity for victims to come forward
and tell their stories, and an official finding of the facts."8 Some of the
first commissions, including those of Chile and Argentina, were primar-
ily founded to pursue such simple fact-finding.'19
This 'facts only' approach allows a victim's family members to learn
the urgent details, ending a state of uncertainty that has itself been
determined to be a form of cruel and inhuman treatment.'20 In this way, it
at least acknowledges what Jos6 Zalaquett, member of the Chilean
National Commission on Truth and Conciliation, calls the "absolute,
unrenounceable value" of the truth in these circumstances.' 2' Weiner's
model also leaves open the possibility for accurate and appropriate
reparation measures later. After all, "to provide for measures of
reparation and prevention," according to Zalaquett, "it must be clearly
known what should be repaired and prevented."' 2
It became clear to the Chilean Commissioners early in their work
that "a full disclosure of the truth had enormous links with the beginning
of a reparative process and in the way we came to understand it.'12 Since
the procedure included dimensions unheard of in the usual State investi-
gation of a particular crime-a chance for all victims to come forward
and give their testimonies and a general, public determination of the
facts-different results were also certainly intended. Priscilla Hayner, in
her exhaustive study of the world's truth commissions published last
year, has outlined the typical (and substantial) expectations and benefits
of these official bodies: 1) to clarify and acknowledge the truth; 2) to
respond to the needs and interests of victims; 3) to contribute to justice
and accountability; and 4) to promote reconciliation.' 24 Each of these
aspects in turn constitutes an important remedy for the victim and family
members, and, as Hayner points out, the complete reparative process
begins by securing the truth.
A victim stepping forward and recounting her story initiates the
course of action. This act in itself may produce a cathartic and healing
117. See Pasqualucci, supra note 21, at 333; see also STATEMENT OF LouiS JOINET, su-
pra note 14, 18.
118. Robert Weiner, Trying to Make Ends Meet: Reconciling the Law and Practice of
Human Rights Amnesties, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 857, 857-75 (1995).
119. HAYNER, supra note 12, at 251.
120. Quinteros v. Uruguay, supra note 91, 14.
121. STATEMENT OF THEO VAN BOVEN, supra note 13, 134.
122. Id.
123. Orentlicher, supra note 21, at 456.
124. HAYNER, supra note 12, at 24.
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effect on the deponent.125 Further, the fact that the victim's story is lis-
tened to and publicized gives the victim a public voice and empowers
her. Nevertheless, as of yet, there have not been any systematic studies
completed on the psychological impact of truth commissions per se and
experience has shown both positive and negative consequences to giving
testimony. For example, digging into a painful past is a very demanding
exercise and could result in retraumatization. The subsequent publicity
could also endanger the deponent or even ostracize her from the com-
munity.' 6 Thus, since truth commissions do not offer long-term therapy,
victims take a risk by telling their stories at all.'27
Moreover, some activists insist that the truth commission does not
"establish" a new truth at all. Rather, it merely lifts a veil of denial about
generally known but unspoken truths.128 In fact, most testimonies are• • • 129
published without any further attention or investigation. Why then,
does the victim still take great pains to recount her suffering? One of the
principal answers is simple: survivors seek acknowledgement from the
State that their claims are credible and the atrocities were wrong. The
truth commission report that is issued, officially sanctioned by the gov-
ernment, will often be their first and last chance for such recognition. 3 °
Thus, it is clear that the truth commission's work, despite any inevi-
table flaws,' must be widely diffused.12 Full circulation allows a society
to truly assimilate the information. Comprehensive distribution of the
report provides a means of informing all those harmed by widespread
abuse that the State accepts responsibility."' In addition, this integration
of the truth will establish and preserve an accurate collective memory so
125. Yael Danieli, Justice and Reparation: Steps in the Process of Healing, in REINING
IN IMPUNITY FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND SERIOUS VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL Hu-
MAN RIGHTS 304 (Christopher C. Joyner & M. Cherif Bassiouni eds., 1998) (if trauma is not
spoken about, it could have negative psychological health consequences).
126. Jeanne Woods, Reconciling Reconciliation, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF.
81, 102-09 (1998).
127. HAYNER, supra note 12, at 135.
128. Id. at 25; see also Woods, supra note 126, at 102.
129. HAYNER, supra note 12, at 25.
130. Id. at 26; see also Woods, supra note 126, at 102.
131. Of course, the truth commission's report is bound to human and practical limita-
tions. One of the more significant problems has been that often only political crimes are
addressed, leaving significant abuses such as rape outside the focus of the work. See HAYNER,
supra note 12, at 79.
132. See, e.g., Mdndez, supra note 20, at 49.
133. See Juan E. Mdndez, Derecho a la Verdad, in APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES BY LOCAL TRIBUNALS, supra note 9, at 538 (in reference to the cases of Haiti and
Uruguay, stating that without wide diffusion and clear results a truth commission is a "contra-
diction in terms").
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that the society may avoid historical revisionism and, in turn, the repeti-
tion of atrocities in the future.'
34
In exceptional cases, the government may issue an express statement
of apology upon accepting the findings of the truth commission or at
some point thereafter. In Chile, President Patricio Aylwin made an emo-
tional plea broadcast on national television, in which he begged
forgiveness from the families of the victims.'35 Studies have shown that
an apology is far superior to a mere acknowledgement of the facts in
promoting healing and reconciliation among victims.'36 This is because
an apology involves
the exchange of power between the offender and offended. By
apologizing, you take the shame of your offense and redirect it
to yourself. You admit to hurting or diminishing someone, and in
effect, say that you are really the one who is diminished.
3 7
This power exchange is necessary to remove the stigma and inner
turmoil often suffered by victims and family members. For example, in
Argentina, the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, an outspoken victims' ad-
vocacy group, officially refused economic reparations in the absence of
explicit social and historical recognition that their disappeared children
had been only political opponents and not criminals.'38 Rigoberta
Menchdi states that for the Guatemalan people to begin reconciliation
with perpetrators of rights abuse, the criminals must first recognize their
crimes and then must expressly repent.'39 She says that while repentance
does not occur, she is condemned to remain a sinner along with the kill-
ers of her family because she has not been given the opportunity to
forgive. 140
In this way, amnesty laws and presidential pardons for the sake of
"reconciliation"-what Oliver Jackman, currently a judge on the Inter-
American Court, once called "forcible amnesia"' 4 '- should be curtailed
134. See STATEMENT OF Louis JOINET, supra note 14, 17. Note also that the official
Guatemalan truth commission was called the "Commission for Historical Clarification."
135. HAYNER, supra note 12, at 26.
136. See Danieli, supra note 125, at 306; Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice:
Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REv. 289, 306 (2001).
137. Latif, supra note 136, at 306 (quoting Aaron Lazare, Go Ahead Say You're Sorry, 28
PSYCHOL. TODAY, Jan/Feb. 1995, at 40, 42).
138. See Danieli, supra note 125, at 309.
139. Rigoberta Menchti, Address at the United Methodist Church, Global Ministries Pro-
gram, New York City (Apr. 23, 2001).
140. Id.
141. Orentlicher, supra note 21, at 433.
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at all costs.14 First of all, as discussed earlier, they often prevent a State
from complying with its fundamental duty to provide effective remedies
after rights abuse. Secondly, amnesties and pardons frequently preclude
the crucial shift in psychological power to victims, which occurs when
the State acknowledges its wrongdoing and perpetrators are brought to
justice. Human Rights Watch, in response to Argentine President Carlos
Menem's sweeping pardons, protested that "reconciliation is a worthy
goal, but cannot be imposed by decree on a society."1 43 Menem's actions
may have been appropriate, however, if there was evidence that the mili-
tary was "genuinely contrite about its role during the 'dirty war' and
ready to seek reconciliation with their victims.'
44
Thus, the truth about systematic abuses, coupled with official ac-
knowledgement, and ideally an apology, potentially leads to forgiveness,
which in turn promotes both individual healing and societal reconcilia-
tion. 145 Nevertheless, many insist that the healing process that truth
commissions initiate is no substitute for a judicial remedy: perpetrators
must be brought to court and duly punished.146 Indeed, as discussed pre-
viously, a judicial process is clearly mandated by the Inter-American
Court and the UN Human Rights Committee in circumstances of gross
abuse, although the European approach is less certain. It must be con-
ceded, however, that prosecuting a large number of cases, much less all
potential cases, would constitute a logistical impossibility for judicial
infrastructures newly risen from the ashes of authoritarian rule. 47 Still,
some amount of prosecution is essential for deterrence, a general societal
benefit, as well as for restoring the dignity of the individual victim.'
48
Human Rights Watch underscores the remedial nature of prosecution for
the individual: "punishment represents the most powerful way that soci-
ety can demonstrate to the victims of abuse that their suffering is not
taken lightly."' 49 Further, without any prosecution, a society runs the risk
of turning some of its more angry and desperate victims into private vigi-
lantes, if no other judicial recourse is provided.'50
142. Even when such legislation is democratically approved, M6ndez cautions, it will
probably not represent the interests of victims, who are usually by definition the "powerless
minority." See M6ndez, supra note 20, at 52.
143. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TRUTH AND PARTIAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTINA: AN UPDATE
69 (1997).
144. Id.
145. See STATEMENT OF LOUIS JOINET, supra note 14, 1 17-18, 41-42.
146. Id. 1 27; see Teitel, supra note 16, at 317;
147. See STATEMENT OF LOUIS JOINET, supra note 14, 48 (mentioning the case of
Rwanda, where over 90,000 people were in prison facing charges during 1997).
148. Orentlicher, supra note 21, at 438-39.
149. See Pasqualucci, supra note 21, at 352.
150. It must be recalled that even when amnesties and pardons ban prosecutions and tri-
als, a family member's right to learn the truth behind a victim's fate still endures, as
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Hayner agrees with the importance of trials; in fact, she shows that a
stated intention of most commissions has been to contribute to justice in
the courts: many have forwarded their files to the relevant authorities and
have recommended prosecution. 5' Nevertheless, she emphasizes that,
although both trials and truth commissions perform the task of investi-
gating into past crimes, neither can fulfill the essential role of the other.
A trial's focus is very distinct: to establish guilt in specific instances, and
even the limited truth it may bring to light is further obscured by strict
rules of evidence. Thus, a trial does not demonstrate how larger seg-
ments of society have been complicit in the crimes under examination;
on the other hand, the very purpose of a truth commission is to document
and explain pervasive patterns of abuse in order to paint a broader por-
trait of culpability.
5 2
Harvard psychiatrist Judith Herman has noted that more than
punishment, many victims are desperate for perpetrators to be obligated
"to give something back, or to try to clean up the mess that they made"' 5 3
As indicated above, this response begins with an acknowledgement of
the offense and an apology. Further forms of "moral" restitution have
also been identified in the truth commission experience as effective in
restoring the dignity of the victim and thus key in fostering forms of
social resolution.54 For example, the "purging" of guilty officers from
the military, rehabilitative services, educational programs about the
events, accessible national archives, memorial services, monuments, and
cultural performances all help heal the rupture between victims and
society.' 5  Even the symbolic value of receiving a regular check from the
government is inestimable: "every time a check arrives," a victim in
recognized, inter alia, by the Lapac6 settlement. Yet many governments still rebuff private
efforts to obtain this information; as a result, victims cannot pursue civil proceedings either,
since they are unable to establish facts critical to their claim. A recent innovation by the Chil-
ean Supreme Court, however, may in fact allow prosecutions to proceed against those
implicated in disappearances, despite amnesty legislation to the contrary. The Court adopted
the reasoning that the original offense is still ongoing, and thus extends beyond the cutoff that
absolves crimes occurring before 1978. See HAYNER, supra note 12, at 98 n.30 , 239.
151. Id. at 90.
152. Of course, the individual characteristics of truth commissions have varied widely.
South Africa was the most "judicial," endowed with the power to grant amnesties and obli-
gated to provide the accused with some form of "due process." Further, commissions have
differed with respect to the specificity of their findings. For example, Guatemala had a very
broad focus and no perpetrators' names were given, while Chile revealed a more "individual-
ized truth." See HAYNER, supra note 12, at 35-49.
153. Id. at 147.
154. This has been called "simultaneously a sociopolitical and psychological process"
by the Latin American Institute of Mental Health and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile.
Danieli, supra note 126, at 306.
155. Id. at 305-06; see also HAYNER, supra note 12, at 157; M6ndez & Mariezcurrena,
supra note 11, at 98-101.
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Chile explains, "it's a recognition of the crime." '56 In this regard,
psychologist Yael Danieli points out that money must accompany other
forms of reparation, if only because it is understood that in our system of
justice, when damage occurs money is paid.5 7 Of course, financial
compensation in many cases is also simply indispensable for daily
subsistence, especially when a family has lost its primary source of
financial support.
B. International Human Rights Courts as a Means
of Providing an "Integral" Remedy
A truth commission can make general recommendations for a nu-
anced reparations program that the government may adopt, including
wide-ranging nonmonetary measures,5 ' and thus greatly serve the com-
plex needs of victims.'59 Such a model, though based only on nonbinding
recommendations, has greater potential impact upon a devastated society
than the more individualized reparations ordered by the European and
Inter-American Courts of Human Rights to date. In fact, only the Inter-
American Court has required measures above simple monetary damages
to victims of gross abuse.'"
The European Court, other than demanding an effective investigation
in cases of serious rights violations, has not ventured beyond awarding
monetary compensation for material and moral damages or payments for
cost. In fact, in many cases the ECHR has held that a favorable decision
alone constituted "just satisfaction to the injured party" and that, as a
consequence, a further award of compensation was not necessary.' 6' The
ECHR has refused to order or even recommend that the respondent gov-
ernment amend its legislation. 62 Further, as already discussed, the ECHR
does not require criminal proceedings to be instituted. 63 Although such a
limited framework may have been sufficient in the past, recent cases in-
volving Turkey, where the Court's response to increasingly "serious"
violations has been merely to augment the sum of damages ordered,
156. HAYNER, supra note 12, at 157.
157. Danieli, supra note 125, at 309.
158. See, for example, the case of South Africa. See supra note 154; HAYNER, supra note
12, at 40-45.
159. See HAYNER, supra note 12, at 251; Mdndez & Mariezcurrena, supra note 11, at 97.
160. This discussion does not include the Inter-American Court's "provisional meas-
ures," which are very wide-ranging.
161. Theo Van Boven, Reparations: A Requirement of Justice 8 (1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
162. Id. (manuscript at 8).
163. Id.
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have shown that this conservative approach is in need of revision.' 4 In
Selmouni v. France, even the ECHR conceded that "the victim suffered
personal and non-pecuniary injury for which the findings of violations in
this judgment do not afford sufficient satisfaction." '65 Moreover, the
ECHR was sharply criticized for its McCann decision, where it found
three violations of the right to life, yet declined to award even compensa-
tory damages since the victims had planned terrorist activities.1
66
On the other hand, there has been a marked development in the In-
ter-American Court's jurisprudence to order not only monetary damages
but also additional remedial and reparative measures for victims of seri-
ous human rights abuses. 67 Part of the explanation is found in the
IACHR's expansive reparations provision, article 63.1 of the American
Convention, which grants it much more latitude than that permitted its
European counterpart. 68 In relevant part, article 63.1 provides that the
IACHR shall also rule "if appropriate, that the consequences of the
measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom
be remedied."' 69 The IACHR has shown an increasing tendency to invoke
its "social reconstruction competence."'
70
In the very first instance, Aloeboetoe,17 1 the IACHR ordered, in addi-
tion to monetary compensation for the direct victims of abuse, the
reopening of a school and medical clinic in a small village of Suriname,
thus benefiting the entire community after a brutal military operation.
After a lapse of several years the IACHR took up this approach again,
requiring legislative reform in Loayza Tamayo.
7 1
164. See, e.g., Aksoy v. Turkey, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, 2289-90 (1996), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp.
165. Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, 188.
166. See Van Boven, supra note 161 (manuscript at 10).
167. It should also be noted that the Court affords victims a high degree of attention by
granting them a separate judgment phase, often occurring months after the proceedings on the
merits, where reparations alone are argued and determined. Such an elaborate procedure is
unparalleled in the European context.
168. Article 41 (a slightly amended version of the earlier article 50) of the European
Convention only provides for "just satisfaction to the injured party." European Convention,
supra note 18, art. 41.
169. American Convention, supra note 18, art. 63.1.
170. See Van Boven, supra note 161 (manuscript at 11).
171. Aloeboetoe Case, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 15, 96
(Sept. 10, 1993), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
172. Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 42,
1192 (Nov. 27, 1998), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr. The Court's relatively gradual
approach to nonpecuniary measures may have been viewed as justified to some, especially
after Peru responded to its command for legislative reform in Loayza by rejecting the Court's
jurisdiction.
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Paniagua Morales,'73 a case involving State-sponsored abductions
and killings, is representative of the IACHR's current reparative
orientation. There, consistent with its first precedents, the IACHR saw fit
to award material and moral damages, as well as to mandate that
Guatemala investigate the facts that gave rise to the violations, and
identify and punish those responsible.'74 Beyond this traditional remedial
scheme, the Court also ordered that the State transport the remains of
one victim to a burial place chosen by his family members.' 5 More
interesting still, the IACHR was precise in requiring that Guatemala
provide transparency in its official records of detained persons, by taking
"legislative, administrative, and any other kinds of measures necessary"
toward this end.17 Also of significance, during the same session but in a
different case, the Court required Guatemala to create an educational
center in memory of children that were killed by government agents.
77
Finally, in the Bdmaca Veldsquez reparations judgment of February
2002,17 the IACHR, although once again refusing to recognize a victim's
explicit legal right to the truth, 79 nonetheless made a powerful statement
through its remedial orders. In addition to requiring material and moral
damages and a full investigation, including the punishment of the perpe-
trators, the Court demanded that the State publish in two national
newspapers the facts proven and the legal conclusions reached two years
ago in the judgment on the merits."" Furthermore, Guatemala was or-
dered to acknowledge, through a public presentation, its responsibility in
the case and the suffering it had caused the victims."'
In sum, the preceding discussion has shown the capabilities of truth
commissions, and to a more limited extent, human rights tribunals to
173. Paniagua Morales, Case 76, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2001), at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
174. Id. 1229.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Villagrin Morales, Case 77, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2001), 123, at http://
www.corteidh.or.cr.
178. Bdmaca Velsquez Case, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no. 70,
18 (Feb. 22, 2002), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr.
179. The Court again acknowledged the development of the concept in international hu-
man rights law, but referred to its merits decision of 2000 holding that the right to the truth is
subsumed by rights to due process and judicial remedies. Id. 1 75-76.
180. Id. l 106.
181. Id. Other remedies of note ordered in the case include: the State must find and ex-
hume the victim's remains as well as deliver them to the family members; it must also take
legislative and all other necessary measures to conform internal legal norms to international
standards of human rights and humanitarian law. Id.
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initiate, in the words of Juan Mdndez, an "integral remedy" for victims
who have suffered gross human rights violations.12 Such a reparative
scheme, which many commentators demand the State to provide, begins
with the cessation of the violation and "full and public disclosure" and
acknowledgement of the truth.'83 To be sure, among available forms of
reparation, monetary awards are also imperative to meet the practical
needs of victims and to underscore the State's responsibility.
Furthermore, according to UN Special Rapporteur Van Boven, the
oft-discarded non-pecuniary measures which he defines as "rehabilita-
tion," "satisfaction," and "guarantees of non-repetition" also constitute
essential devices "with a view to restore and to repair in a more struc-
tural manner, both with regard to individuals and collectivities. '' An
exploration of these necessary remedies, some of which have been en-
countered above, proves instructive. "Rehabilitation" includes medical
and psychological care as well as legal and social services.'85 "Satisfac-
tion" and "guarantees of non-repetition," in addition to putting an end to
the violation and disseminating the truth, consist of the following: an
official declaration or legal judgment restoring the dignity, reputation,
and legal rights of the victim and/or persons closely associated with the
victim; apology, including public acknowledgement of the facts and ac-
ceptance of responsibility; judicial or administrative sanctions against
the perpetrators; commemorations to the victims; educational programs
and training about the violations and human rights in general; ensuring
effective civilian control of military and security forces; restricting mili-
tary jurisdiction; and strengthening the independence of the judiciary,
among others.'86 In this way, after wide-scale rights violations, a broad
range of policy strategies are required to shape an adequate remedial
solution for victims. Such strategies must involve the government, judi-
ciary, law enforcement and educational systems, and many other sectors
of society.'87
182. Mdndez & Mariezcurrena, supra note 11, at 97.
183. Id. at 88; see also STATEMENT OF THEO VAN BOVEN, supra note 13, '1134; STATE-
MENT OF Louis JOINET, supra note 14, In 17, 24.
184. Van Boven, supra note 161 (manuscript at 14).
185. Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, Note by the Secretary-General, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, U.N.
ESCOR, 53rd Sess., app. 14, U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1997/104 (1997).
186. Id. at app. 15.
187. See Van Boven, supra note 161 (manuscript at 14).
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V. THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT REMEDIES
AND PROMISING DEVELOPMENTS
What is the status of such a broader, victim-oriented concept of rem-
edy in the United States? Although experts such as Van Boven originally
intended a more extensive framework for large segments of society who
have suffered systematic, gross abuse at the hands of the State, there still
have been many calls in the United States to provide victims with similar
remedial benefits--especially in response to particularly violent
crimes.'88 To evaluate the remedies available and possible innovations for
the future, a brief review of the victim's changed position in U.S. legal
history is necessary.
A. Background
Starting prior to the American Revolution, the victim acted as the
primary decision maker in the criminal process, effectively functioning
as both policeman and prosecutor. While criminal prosecutions were
technically brought in the name of the State, they were actually private
processes, funded by the victims, in which the State often did not take an
active role and did not have a vested interest. 189 Since the aggrieved party
was the central actor in the system, her restitution and compensation
constituted principal goals of the criminal proceeding.
Yet after the Revolution, the United States began to adopt Enlight-
enment ideas of criminal justice; most important among them, that crime
was an offense against society.'" If used properly, then, the criminal jus-
tice system could deter crime and even rehabilitate criminals from their
fallen state. This led to the evolution of a public prosecution bureaucracy
that favored State interests in deterrence, punishment, and rehabilitation
over addressing harm done to the individual. 9' The fate of victims may
have been sealed when the drafters of the Bill of Rights never expressly
outlined their rights, leaving them in a very precarious position. Thus, by
the nineteenth century, crime came to be dealt with almost entirely as an
offense against the State, and a victim's role in the proceeding was re-
duced to little more than witness. Reflecting this dynamic, the Supreme
188. Sue Anna Moss Cellini, The Proposed Victims' Rights Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States: Opening the Door of the Criminal Justice System to the Victim, 14
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMp. LAW 839, 853-54 (1997).
189. William F. McDonald, The Role of the Victim in America, in ASSESSING THE CRIMI-
NAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 295, 295-98 (Randy Barnett &
John Hagel IlI eds., 1977) [hereinafter ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL].
190. Id.
191. Id. Part of the rationale for expanding the role of the public prosecutor was so that
law enforcement would pursue crimes committed against all classes of society, not only the
wealthy.
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Court ruled many years later that "in American jurisprudence at least, a
private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or
non-prosecution of another."'
92
Since the redress of a victim is no longer regarded as a function of
the criminal process, if she wishes to recover her losses she must hire a
lawyer and sue in tort.'93 Yet, civil suits, even if they lead to an eventual
judgment and damages against an offender, still lack the moral impact
and official sanction of criminal trials or, in the experience of other na-
tions, official bodies such as truth commissions.' 9 Another crucial
distinction to be made is that civil trials place an enormous burden on the
victims and their families, who are forced to finance and manage all
phases of the litigation. Moreover, even establishing sufficient facts for a
civil action in the face of obstruction or conspiracy by the potential de-
fendants may be prohibitive.' 95 Yet, in the criminal sphere, once a
decision to prosecute is made, the vast resources of the government are
readily available for investigation, litigation, and enforcement of the sub-
sequent judgment.
Of course, the tort route is much better than nothing at all. Victims
have complete control of the process from the beginning to end, in stark
contrast to the criminal proceeding. As one victim lamented, "the State
of New York was not kidnapped, beaten, and raped-I was."' 96 Further-
more, as in the practice of truth commissions, the victim is given a
public voice: she may tell her truth in a formal, State-authorized set-
ting.' 97 Finally, a favorable judgment may not only be financially
rewarding, but it morally vindicates the victim-serving as an important
acknowledgement that she was right and the defendants were wrong.
Thus, victims must turn to the traditional forms of tort remedy for
redress. The available remedies at law consist in restitution and compen-
satory damages, while those in equity are restitution and injunction. Yet
in practice, in the event of serious civil rights abuses, U.S. courts, like
their international counterparts, generally have awarded only monetary
192. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
193. Many have found this recourse incongruous if the nature of the offense is very seri-
ous. This is because a tort is defined as merely a private wrong, while a crime involves moral
culpability, as well as both individual and societal harm. Yet, in the United States, genocide
and war crimes are considered "torts" for the purposes of statutes such as the Alien Tort
Claims Act-a legal convenience which some have remarked diminishes the gravity of such
transgressions. See Beth Stephens, Conceptualizing Violence Under International Law: Do
Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 579, 581 (1997).
194. See Ratner, supra note 115, at 747.
195. See supra note 150 (discussing private efforts to gather information in the context
of Argentina and Chile).
196. Cellini, supra note 188, at 850.
197. Note that victim impact statements are at times permitted in criminal trials. See in-
fra Section V.B.
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damages to the aggrieved party. In the landmark case Bivens,' 98 where
federal narcotics agents conducted a flagrantly unlawful arrest and
search, the Supreme Court found, for the first time, a cause of action
against federal officers for constitutional violations. The Court stated,
"[h]istorically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for
an invasion of personal interests in liberty."'99 In his concurring opinion,
Justice Harlan wrote, "[flor people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or
nothing," underscoring the fact that victims such as Bivens would not
benefit from injunctive relief, given the one-time nature of the constitu-
tional violation.2 O By the same token, through a literal reading of the
concept of restitution, it would be impossible for the defendants to re-
store to the victim the intangible rights taken from him, along with the
pain and suffering, humiliation, and embarrassment they caused him.2'
The primary vehicle today for relief against state and local officials
who violate the Constitution, 42 USCA § 1983, also generally provides
only monetary damages to victims of State-sponsored violence or
abuse. 2 In a scenario where a state officer committed a constitutional
violation and death results, the decedent's survivors would recover for
the various injuries suffered by the decedent.0 3 As intimated by Justice
Harlan, even numerous incidents of police abuse are resistant to injunc-
tive measures because such behavior does not typically reach a
systematic threshold. Further, particular individuals do not encounter the
police with enough predictability to be awarded an injunction .2  On the
other hand, actions seeking institutional reform, such as the line of
school desegregation cases, or the reinstatement of employment, which
fall out of the scope of this note, frequently receive remedies in equity.205
Thus, at least in the realm of the State-sponsored rights violations
focused upon in this essay, Danieli was right: in our society, cash is
doled out for a wrong.2l Meanwhile, the remedies urged by Van Boven,
which would fall under the headings of "satisfaction" and "guarantees of
non-repetition," are woefully lacking in the U.S. system of justice.
198. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
199. Id. at 395.
200. Id. at 410.
201. See, e.g., Murry N. Rothbard, Punishment and Proportionality, in ASSESSING THE
CRIMINAL, supra note 189, at 259, 262-63.
202. MICHAEL COLLINS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 150-89 (1997).
203. Id. at 156.
204. On the other hand, if a widespread practice of forced disappearances were the case,
an injunction could be a possibility!
205. COLLINS, supra note 202, at 167.
206. Of course, State officials may also be prosecuted, but these processes are generally
not conducted with the victim in mind. See infra Section V.B.
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Nevertheless, some recent developments have the promise to introduce
more inclusive reparative schemes in the future.
B. A Greater Role for Victims in the Criminal Process?
The 1982 Presidential Task Force on Victims of Crime concluded
that "somewhere along the way, the criminal system began to serve law-
yers and judges and defendants, treating the victim with institutionalized
disinterest.'2°7 Congress has responded by passing an array of legislation
such as the Victims' Bill of Rights,2°8 which contains, inter alia, provi-
sions for victims' compensation and restitution 209 programs; the inclusion
of victim impact statements and testimony; the right to information
about all phases of the criminal process, including the release of the of-
fender; and a qualified right to be present at all public court
proceedings.2 °
Nevertheless, these privileges are greatly undermined by the victims'
lack of standing, which has prevented them from claiming such rights
when they are denied or neglected.2 ' As a result, in 1997 an amendment
to the Constitution was proposed, which would not only further expand a
victim's role in criminal proceedings beyond the above-mentioned legis-
lation, but would also grant them the standing necessary to assert such
rights.22 Certainly, such procedural rights are capable of providing im-
portant measures of "satisfaction" to the victims, in the Van Boven sense,
by empowering them, restoring their dignity, and protecting their safety.
C. Restorative Models and the Apology
Some scholars maintain that "moral" and psychological forms of
restitution to the victim are consistent with the U.S. legal tradition.2 3
Indeed, the early colonial system seems to show characteristics of the
restitutionary theory of justice. Randy Barnett explains that this
207. Cellini, supra note 188, at 851 (quoting PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF
CRIME, FINAL REPORT 2-13 (Dec. 1982)).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 10606 (1994).
209. Restitution here is understood as the offender providing payments to the victim to
cover the actual loss suffered, attorney's fees, and even future wage loss. See, e.g., George
Blum, Measure and Elements of Restitution to Which Victim is Entitled Under State Criminal
Statute, 15 A.L.R. 5TH 391 (1993).
210. Note that victims in many states are afforded indirect participation in the criminal
prosecution where statutes authorize a victim's attorney to assist prosecutors. Further, a sub-
stantial number of jurisdictions, in an attempt to assist in recovery from the consequences of
crime, have also adopted laws which provide for compensation or restitution. See Cellini,
supra note 188, at 868.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Grundhoefer, 916 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1990).
212. See S.J. Res. 6, 105th Cong. (1997). Compare with the rights secured to individuals
under article 8 of the American Convention. American Convention, supra note 18, art. 8.
213. See McDonald, supra note 189, at 296.
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paradigm identifies a crime as an unjust redistribution of entitlements by
force that requires for its rectification a redistribution of entitlements
from the offender to the victim.24 The restitutionary theory, then, seeks
to vindicate the rights of the aggrieved party as was the practice in
eighteenth-century America. In doing so, according to Barnett, the rights
of all persons will be vindicated, since anything less than a victim-
centered system of justice demeans the very notion of individual
rights.2
Thus, following restitutionary theory, a crime results in an "imbal-
ance" between the offender and victim that cannot be addressed merely
by inflicting punishment on the criminal. Rather, Barnett explains, "the
criminal act creates a nexus between the offender and his victim that will
be removed only when the offender has performed some constructive act
of reparation for the victim or the victim's heirs.2 6 Although Barnett
emphasized that reparative measures must be "constructive" for the vic-
tim, he admits that the possible remedies may never fully compensate
the suffering experienced.27
At the very time Barnett was writing on the restitutionary theory of
justice in the late 1970s, the key notion of restorative justice was merely
in its infancy. Only by the mid-1990s did this movement gain a strong
foothold internationally, including a presence in the United States.2 8 Re-
storative justice is an innovative process of bringing together the
individuals who have been affected by an offense and having them agree
on how to repair the harm caused by the crime-a model that clearly
parallels the goals of restitutionary theory."'
Restorative justice "conferences" or "sentencing circles" are
informed by traditional indigenous practices and involve not only the
victim and offender, but also "supporters" of each and even concerned
members of the community.20 In order to heal the suffering of the victim,
participants establish a plan of action that includes ways of making
amends to the victim and perhaps to the community-measures that
could be considered the "punishment" for the offender.22' The technique
has proven to have very broad appeal. Participant (victim, offender,
214. Randy Barnett, Introduction, in ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL, supra note 189, at 1.
215. Id. at 25-26.
216. Id. at 27 (emphasis added). Compare with psychiatrist Judith Herman's observa-
tions, that victims desire substantive returns from perpetrators, rather than their simple
punishment. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
217. Barnett, supra note 214, at 27.
218. See John Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or
Utopian?, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999).
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1744.
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community, police) satisfaction ranges between 90 and 95 percent,
owing to its focus on holding offenders responsible for their actions and
giving victims' rights a more central place in the system.222
Most interesting, according to Professor John Braithwaite's exten-
sive studies of such conferences in the United States, "material
reparation was much less important than emotional or symbolic repara-
tion." Moreover, he observes that "victims often wanted an apology more
than compensation.,, 223 Braithwaite states that these one- to two-hour epi-
sodes may often attain forgiveness in the victim. Further, she frequently
emerges with ways to help her feel safer after the trauma, since the plan
of action typically works to prevent a recurrence of the crime.224 These
results confirm the preceding findings of psychologists and truth com-
missions after gross violations of human rights: the victim most desires
recognition of the truth, an apology, and other moral amends from the
offender. Certainly the benefits, both individual healing and societal rein-
tegration, are the same sought by Van Boven's framework. In fact, future
truth commissions would do well to learn from the restorative justice
paradigm while devising their methodologies.
The punitive criminal justice system in the United States would do
even better to incorporate restorative principals in a systematic fashion-
beginning with the acknowledgement of truth and an apology. The en-
during American emphasis on monetary damages is a completely
inadequate method of providing a true satisfaction to victims (and even
damages may elude victims in many instances). On the other hand, in the
restorative justice setting, victims often directly witness an offender's
explicit act of repentance,225 which they have identified as extremely sat-
isfying, clearly helping them "get over [their] sense of loss.,226
Of course, apologies per se are not a complete rarity in the U.S. legal
and historical landscape. Some of the most significant attempts at recon-
ciliation in our nation's past included official requests for forgiveness.
For example, apologies were offered by the State to Japanese-Americans
for World War II internment and to African-Americans for the Tuskegee
experiments. In general legal practice, however, apologies have perhaps
functioned most prominently within the field of alternative dispute reso-
lution. Indeed, professors Stephen Goldberg, Frank Sander, and Nancy
Rodgers have insisted that the first lesson of dispute resolution is the
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Latif, supra note 136, at 294 (one study recorded an apology in 95 percent of
conferences observed).
226. Id. at 293.
227. Id. at 295.
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importance of apologizing.2 8 Even former Attorney General Janet Reno
has remarked upon "the power of an apology sincerely given" in such
negotiation settings 9
Furthermore, there has been a recent and promising tendency for
judges to order apologies as remedies for both civil disputes and criminal
offenses, though it is possible their aim seeks to punish the offender
more than restore the victim. In 2000, an Ohio judge sentenced defen-
dants convicted of disorderly conduct and petty theft to make public
apologies by taking out advertisements in the county newspaper, and
another was obligated to sit for two hours at a local YMCA and render
apologies to all victims who desired them.23° In a federal case in Texas,
wife batterers were required to apologize to their spouses before
women's groups. 3 Other judges as well have given offenders the option
232to make a public apology rather than serve a prison term. Moreover,
seven states currently allow evidence of an apology as a mitigating factor
in the determination of punitive and compensatory damages in defama-
233tion cases.
It is true that any form of "partial" or coerced apology could have
limited value for the healing of the victim, and thus for the fostering of
reconciliation within the community. Yet the above discussion has shown
that the apology's inherent restorative potential must not be underesti-
mated. Indeed, in Japan a prosecutor will often not even file criminal
charges if the offender has apologized.3 Certainly then, further integrat-
ing an acknowledgement of the truth and the apology into the U.S. legal
framework is a crucial step toward a more victim-oriented approach to
remedy.
In conclusion, this analysis has located the origins of a vital, and still
relatively new remedial concept in international human rights jurispru-
dence-a right to the truth-within the State's positive duty to
investigate. Yet, in response to broad-based demands for information,
acknowledgement, and atonement following State-sponsored human
rights abuse, this concept has rapidly developed a rich texture and its
228. Id.
229. Id. at 298.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 297.
233. Id. at 298 (Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
West Virginia).
234. Id.
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own established status as part of a universally recognized "effective rem-
edy." Moreover, the dynamic experience of truth commissions has
underscored that truth plays an essential role in beginning an "integral"
reparative process for victims, which experts now demand after serious
abuses of human rights. Thus, one could argue that the restorative nature
of truth is as much remedial as it is reparative, as much procedural as
substantive, and as much immediate as enduring.
Furthermore, this Note has urged, in response to all rights violations,
a wider incorporation of truth, apology, and other victim-oriented reme-
dies, both in international and U.S. legal fora. Such measures of
"rehabilitation," "satisfaction," and "guarantees of non-repetition" will
promote individual healing and community restoration, and, in the event
of pervasive abuse and societal rupture, will also enable lasting recon-
ciliation processes to take hold in due time.
